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Abstract
In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from sequencing
situations in which the processing times are not xed. We show that these games are balanced by
obtaining two core elements that depend only on the optimal schedule for the grand coalition.
Furthermore we show that, although these games are not convex in general, many marginal
vectors are core elements. We also consider convexity for special instances of the sequencing
situation.
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1 Introduction
In one-machine sequencing situations each agent has one job that has to be processed on a single
machine. Each job is specied by a processing time, and costs are assumed to be linear in the
completion time. Furthermore, an initial order on the jobs is given. The objective is to nd a
processing order that minimizes total cost. Once this optimal order is obtained, the question arises
how to allocate the total cost savings to the agents. Curiel et al. [4] consider this problem by
introducing cooperative sequencing games. They show that these games are convex, and hence
possess core allocations. Furthermore they characterize an allocation rule that divides the cost
savings obtained by complete cooperation.
Nowadays, a variety of sequencing games exist in cooperative game theory. Many of these
sequencing games arise from extended classes of one-machine sequencing situations. Hamers et
al. [7] study balancedness of sequencing games that arise from situations in which ready times
are imposed on the jobs. Similarly, Borm et al. [2] investigate balancedness in case due dates are
included and Hamers et al. [9] show that if chain precedences are imposed on the jobs, and the
initial order is a concatenation of these chains, then the corresponding sequencing game is convex.
A dierent approach in extending the class of sequencing situations of Curiel et al. [4] is taken
by Van den Nouweland et al. [14], Hamers et al. [8] and Calleja et al. [3]. They investigate
balancedness of sequencing games arising from situations with multiple machines.
In this paper we treat sequencing situations in which the processing times are not xed, so called
sequencing situations with controllable processing times. In reality processing jobs does not only
require a machine, but also additional resources such as manpower, funds, etc. This implies that
jobs can be processed in shorter or longer durations by increasing or decreasing these additional
resources. Of course, deploying these additional resources entails extra costs, but these extra costs
might be compensated by the gains from job completion at an earlier time. Sequencing situations
with controllable processing times are investigated in, among others, Vickson [16; 17], and Alidaee
and Ahmadian [1]. An overview of literature on sequencing situations with controllable processing
times is given in Nowicki and Zdrzalka [11].
1In this paper we consider cooperative games arising from sequencing situations with controllable
processing times. We show that these games are balanced by obtaining two core elements that
depend only on the optimal schedule for the grand coalition. Furthermore we show that many
marginal vectors are core elements, in spite of the fact that these games are not convex in general.
We also consider convexity for some special cases.
In Section 2 we recall notions from cooperative game theory. Furthermore we formally introduce
sequencing situations with controllable processing times and the cooperative games that arise from
these situations. In Section 3 we focus on the core of these sequencing games and in Section 4 we
consider convexity for some special cases.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we will recall some basic notions of cooperative game theory. Then we formally
introduce sequencing situations and games with controllable processing times.
2.1 Cooperative game theory
A cooperative game is a pair (N;v) where N is a nite (player-)set and v, the characteristic function,
is a map v : 2N ! R with v(;) = 0. The map v assigns to each subset S  N, called a coalition, a
real number v(S) called the worth of S. The core of a game (N;v) is the set
C(v) = fx 2 RNjx(S)  v(S) for every S  N;x(N) = v(N)g;
where x(S) =
P
i2S xi. Intuitively the core is the set of payo vectors for which no coalition has
an incentive to split o from the grand coalition. The core can be empty. If the core of a game is
nonempty, the game is called balanced. A cooperative game (N;v) is called superadditive if
v(S) + v(T)  v(S [ T) for all S;T  N with S \ T = ;;
and convex if for all i;j 2 N and S  Nnfi;jg it holds
v(S [ fig) + v(S [ fjg)  v(S [ fi;jg) + v(S): (1)
For convex games the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition exceeds its marginal contri-
bution to a smaller coalition. Note that convex games are balanced ([12]). Now we will introduce
marginal vectors. Consider  : f1;:::;ng ! N, which describes an order on the player set. Dene
[(i);] = f(j) : j  ig for each i 2 f1;:::;ng. That is, [(i);] is the set of players predecessing
player (i) with respect to . The marginal vector m(v) is dened by
m
(i)(v) = v([(i);])   v([(i);]nf(i)g) for each i 2 f1;:::;ng:
That is, each player receives his marginal contribution to the coalition this player joins. We note
that a game is convex if and only if all marginal vectors are core elements (cf. [12] and [10]).
A concept that is closely related to convexity and to marginal vectors is permutationally con-
vexity (cf. [6]). An order  : f1;:::;ng ! N is a permutationally convex order if for all 0  i  k
and S  Nn[(k);] it holds that
v([(i);] [ S) + v([(k);])  v([(k);] [ S) + v([(i);]): (2)
Here we abuse our notation by dening [(0);] = ;. Granot and Huberman [6] show that if
 : f1;:::;ng ! N is a permutationally convex order, then the corresponding marginal vector
m(v) is a core element. The converse of this statement is not true in general.
2We end this subsection with the denition of connected coalitions. Let  : f1;:::;ng ! N be
an order on the player set. A coalition S  N is called connected with respect to  if for every
i;j 2 S with  1(i) <  1(j) it holds that k 2 S for every k 2 N with  1(i)   1(k)   1(j).
We use the notation  1 to denote the inverse of , i.e.  1(k) = l if and only if (l) = k. If
a coalition is not connected, then it consists of several connected components. For T  N, the
connected components with respect to  are denoted by Tn.
2.2 Sequencing situations with controllable processing times
In a sequencing situation with controllable processing times, or cps situation for short, there is a
queue of agents, each with one job, in front of the machine. Each agent has to process his job on the
machine. The set of agents is denoted by N = f1;:::;ng. We assume there is an initial processing
order on the jobs denoted by 0 : f1;:::;ng ! N. For notational simplicity we assume throughout
the paper that 0(i) = i for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. The job of agent i, i 2 N, has an initial processing
time pi  0. This initial processing time can be reduced to at most  pi, the crashed processing time
of job i. The amount of time by which the initial processing time is reduced is the crash time. We
assume that 0   pi  pi for all i 2 N. The cost of each job is linear in the completion time as well
as in the crash time. That is, if t is the completion time and x the crash time of job i, then
ci(t;x) = it + ix
where i and i are positive constants expressing the cost of one time unit waiting in the queue
and one time unit crashing job i, respectively. Since crashing a job requires additional resources,
we assume that i  i for all i 2 N. That is, the reduction of the processing time of a job by
one time unit costs more than the processing of that job by one time unit. A cps situation is now
formally dened by the 6-tuple (N;0;;;p;  p).
Since the processing times are not xed, a processing schedule consists of a pair (;x) where
 : f1;:::;ng ! N denotes the processing order, and x the vector of processing times. The cost of




x(j)) + i(pi   xi);
since
P
j2f1;:::;ng:j 1(i) x(j) is the completion time of job i with respect to the schedule (;x),
and pi   xi equals the crash time of job i.
Finding an optimal schedule for a cps situation falls into the class of NP-hard problems. The
diculty of this problem lies in nding the optimal processing times. Once the optimal processing
times are known, then it is straightforward to nd the optimal processing order by using the Smith-
rule ([13]). The Smith-rule states that the jobs should be processed in order of decreasing urgency
index, where the urgency index ui of a job i 2 N is the quotient between the the completion time
cost coecient and the processing time xi, i.e. ui = i
xi.
Although nding the optimal processing schedule is dicult, the following lemma, due to Vick-
son [16], makes the problem a little easier. This lemma states that there is an optimal schedule
such that the processing time of each job is either equal to its initial processing time, or its crashed
processing time. We note that this result easily follows from the linearity of the cost function.
Lemma 2.1 ([16]) Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation. There exists an optimal schedule
(;x) such that xi 2 fpi;  pig for all i 2 N.
From Lemma 2.1 it follows that the optimal processing schedule can be found be considering all
2n possibilities for the processing times and applying the Smith-rule for each of these possibilities.
Without loss of generality we will assume throughout the paper that optimal schedules satisfy the
property of Lemma 2.1, i.e. if (;x) is an optimal schedule, then it holds that xi 2 fpi;  pig for all
i 2 N.
32.3 Sequencing games with controllable processing times
In this subsection we dene sequencing games arising from cps situations, or cps-games for short.
Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation. The characteristic function of our game will express the
cost savings that each coalition can obtain. For this we have to agree upon which schedules
are admissible for a coalition. We will call a processing schedule admissible for a coalition if it
satises three properties. First, the processing times of players outside the coalition should remain
unchanged. Second, the processing times of the players belonging to the coalition should be feasible,
i.e. in between the crashed processing time and the initial processing time. And nally, the schedule
should be such that the jobs outside the coalition remain in their initial position and no jumps take
place over players outside the coalition. Let AS denote the set of admissible schedules for coalition
S  N. Mathematically, (;x) 2 AS if it holds that
(A1) xi = pi for all i 2 NnS,
(A2) xi 2 [ pi;pi] for all i 2 S,
(A3) fj 2 N :  1(j)   1(i)g = fj 2 N :  1
0 (j)   1
0 (i)g for all i 2 NnS.
Note that (A3) is the admissibility requirement from Curiel et al. [4]. For almost all sequencing









That is, the worth of each coalition is the maximum cost savings they can obtain by means of an
admissible processing schedule. It can easily be seen that cps games are superadditive.
Similarly to Lemma 2.1 it is straightforward to see that for each coalition S  N, there is an
optimal schedule such that the processing time of each job is either equal to its initial processing
time, or to its crashed processing time. Therefore we assume throughout the paper that optimal
schedules satisfy this property. We now give an example of a cps game.
Example 2.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be given by N = f1;2;3;4g,  = (1;1;1;1),  = (2;2;2;2),
p = (10;4;3;15),  p = (4;3;2;5). Now consider for instance coalition f1;2;3g. The optimal schedule
for this coalition is given by (;x) with  = 3214 and x = (10;4;2;15). This yields cost savings
v(f1;2;3g) = 41   26 = 15. The cps game (N;v) is given by v(fig) = 0 for all i 2 N and
S f1;2g f1;3g f1;4g f2;3g f2;4g f3;4g f1;2;3g f1;2;4g f1;3;4g f2;3;4g N
v(S) 6 0 0 1 0 0 15 7 6 2 17
Table 1: A cps game.
From Example 2.1 it immediately follows that cps games are in general not 0-component additive
games (cf. Curiel et al. [5]). A game is called 0-component additive if it is superadditive, and if
the worth of each disconnected coalition with respect to 0 is equal to the sum of the worths of
its connected components. In the cps game of Example 2.1 it holds that f1;3;4g is a disconnected
coalition with respect to 0. It consists of connected components f1g and f3;4g. Since it holds
that v(f1g) + v(f3;4g) < v(f1;3;4g) we conclude that the worth of f1;3;4g is larger than the
sum of the worths of its connected components. Therefore the game is not 0-component additive.
So in spite of the fact that we use a similar admissibility requirement as Curiel et al. [4] we lose
40-component additivity. Note that many sequencing games are proven to be balanced by means
of 0-component additivity (e.g. Borm et al. [2] and Hamers et al. [7]). Example 2.1 also shows
that cps games need not be convex, contrary to the sequencing games of Curiel et al. [4].
Example 2.2 Consider the cps situation from Example 2.1, and the corresponding game. Consider
coalition S = f1;3g, i = 2 and j = 4. Since it holds that v(f1;2;3g) + v(f1;3;4g) = 21 > 17 =
v(N) + v(f1;3g) we conclude that (N;v) is not convex.
3 The core of cps games
In this section we prove balancedness of cps games by showing the existence of core elements. In
particular, we provide two core elements that depend only on the optimal schedule for the grand
coalition. Furthermore we show that many marginal vectors are core elements.
In the rst part of this section we will provide two core elements that depend on the optimal
schedule for the grand coalition. For the perception of these two core elements it is important to
note that the optimal processing schedule for the grand coalition can be reached from the initial
processing schedule in several ways. For example one could rst crash the jobs and then rearrange
them. But one could also rst rearrange the jobs and then crash them. We emphasize these two
possibilities since the construction of our two core elements depends on them.
Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation. Let (;x) 2 AN be an optimal processing schedule for
the grand coalition. For our rst core element, denoted by ((;x)), we will reach this optimal
processing schedule by rst crashing jobs, and then rearranging them. Let ((;x)) be obtained
as follows. First give the cost savings (or costs) obtained by the crashing of a job to the job that
crashes and secondly give the cost savings obtained by interchanging two jobs to the back job. Or




j)   i)(pi   xi) +
X
j2N:j<i
(ixj   jxi)+ for all i 2 N
where ((
P
j2N:ji j)   i)(pi   xi) are the cost savings obtained by crashing job i by (pi   xi)
time. Also observe that if agent j is directly in front of agent i, then the cost savings obtainable
for j and i by switching their order equal (ixj   jxi)+ = maxf(ixj   jxi);0g.
For our second core element, denoted by ((;x)), we reach the optimal schedule (;x) by rst
interchanging jobs to the optimal order, and then crashing them. Let ((;x)) be the following
allocation. First give the possibly negative prot of each neighbourswitch to the back job, and







k) i)(pi xi) for all i 2 N:
Because of notational convenience we will write  and  instead of ((;x)) and ((;x)) if there
can be no confusion about the optimal order that is used. We now give an illustration of  and .
Example 3.1 Let N = f1;2;3g,  = (2;2;2),  = (3;3;3), p = (4;4;8) and  p = (2;1;6). The
optimal order for the grand coalition is now given by  = 213 and the optimal processing times are
x = (2;1;8). Observe that 3 = 3 = 0. Also it holds that 1 = (1 + 2 + 3   1)(p1   x1) =
(6 3)(4 2) = 6 and 2 = (2 +3  2)(p2  x2)+(2x1  1x2)+ = (4 3)(4 1)+(4 2) = 5.
Furthermore, note that 1 = (1 + 3   1)(p1   x1) = (4   3)(4   2) = 2 and that 2 = (2p1  
1p2) + (2 + 1 + 3   2)(p2   x2) = (8   8) + (6   3)(4   1) = 9.
5Before we show that  and  are core elements, we need two lemmas. In the rst we obtain another
expression for  which we will use in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof of this lemma can be
found in the Appendix. The second lemma is a technical but straightforward lemma which we will
use throughout the paper.
Lemma 3.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (;x) 2 AN be an optimal processing
schedule. For all i 2 N it holds that
i = i  
X
j2N:j>i and  1(j)< 1(i)




Lemma 3.2 Let a1;a2;q1;  q1;q2  0 with q1   q1. It holds that a2(q1    q1) + (a2 q1   a1q2)+ 
(a2q1   a1q2)+.
Proof: If (a2q1   a1q2)+ = 0 then the inequality is trivially satised, so suppose that
(a2q1   a1q2)+ > 0. This implies that a2q1   a1q2 > 0. Straightforwardly it follows that
a2(q1    q1) + (a2 q1   a1q2)+  a2(q1    q1) + (a2 q1   a1q2)
= a2q1 a1q2 = (a2q1 a1q2)+: 2
Now we are ready to prove that  2 C(v) and  2 C(v).
Theorem 3.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (N;v) be the corresponding game.
Let (;x) 2 AN be an optimal processing schedule. It holds that  2 C(v) and  2 C(v).
Proof: It is obvious that  and  are ecient, since both  and  divide the total cost savings
of the grand coalition. Let T  N. We need to show that
P
i2T i  v(T) and
P
i2T i  v(T).
We will equivalently show that
P
i2NnT i + v(T)  v(N) and
P
i2NnT i + v(T)  v(N) by
constructing a suboptimal schedule (subopt;psubopt) 2 AN that depends on an optimal processing
schedule of T. We show that the total cost savings obtained in this suboptimal schedule exceed both P
i2NnT i + v(T) and
P
i2NnT i + v(T). Obviously the cost savings in the suboptimal schedule
are at most v(N).


























































i(pj   xj); (10)
where the rst equality holds because of Lemma 3.1. The second equality is satised because for
each pair i;j 2 NnT with j > i and  1(j) <  1(i) every term in (6) also appears in (7) but with
the opposite sign.
Let (T;pT) 2 AT be an optimal schedule for coalition T. Consider the suboptimal schedule
(subopt;psubopt) 2 AN, where p
subopt
j = pT
j if j 2 T, p
subopt
j = xj if j 2 NnT, and subopt is the order
obtained by applying the Smith-rule using the suboptimal processing times. The total cost savings




























































Expressions (11) and (12) are the cost savings obtained by crashing the jobs of T, and expres-
sion (13) the cost savings obtained by crashing the jobs of NnT. The cost savings obtained by
rearranging the jobs are equal to the sum of expressions (14), (15), (16) and (17).
Now we will show that the sum of (3), (4), (5), (10) and v(T) is exceeded by P. Since (10)
is nonnegative, this shows that
P
i2NnT i + v(T) is exceeded by P. Furthermore, since (9) is
nonpositive, it also shows that
P
i2NnT i + v(T) is exceeded by P.




all i 2 T. It also holds that (13) coincides with (3) as well as (14) coincides with (4) because
p
subopt
j = xj for all j 2 NnT. Finally, note that expression (15) is nonnegative. Hence, for showing
that the sum of expressions (3), (4), (5), (10) and v(T) is exceeded by P it is sucient to show
that the sum of (5) and (10) is exceeded by the sum of (12) and (16). We will show that this holds
by comparing the sums term by term.
So let j 2 T, i 2 NnT such that j < i. Note that it now holds that p
subopt




j . We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1:  1(j)   1(i).
In this case it holds that i and j do not have a corresponding term in (10). Therefore we only
need to compare the corresponding term in (5) with the corresponding terms in (12) and (16).
7If it holds that p
subopt




i )+ = (ip
subopt
j   jxi)+ 
(ixj   jxi)+. Hence, the term in (5) is exceeded by the corresponding term in (16). Since the
corresponding term in (12) is nonnegative we conclude that the term in (5) is exceeded by the sum
of the corresponding terms in (12) and (16).
So assume that p
subopt
j < xj. Since optimal processing times only take two values by assumption
it holds that p
subopt
j =  pj and xj = pj. Since j < i it follows that there is a term i(pj   p
subopt
j )
in expression (12). Now according to Lemma 3.2 using a1 = j, a2 = i, q1 = pj,  q1 = p
subopt
j and






i )+  (ipj jp
subopt
i )+ = (ixj jxi)+,
where the equality holds because pj = xj and p
subopt
i = xi.
So in this case it holds that the corresponding terms in (12) and (16) exceed the terms in (5).
Case 2:  1(j) >  1(i).
Since  1(j) >  1(i) it necessarily holds i
xi 
j
xj and thus that ixj   jxi  0. Straightfor-
wardly we obtain that
i(pj   p
subopt




i )+  i(pj   p
subopt





= ipj   jp
subopt
i = i(pj   xj) + (ixj   jp
subopt
i )
= i(pj   xj) + (ixj   jxi)+;
where the last equality holds since p
subopt
i = xi and ixj   jxi  0. We conclude that the corre-
sponding terms of expressions (12) and (16) exceed the corresponding terms of expressions (5) and
(10). This completes the proof. 2
Note that if the optimal schedule is not unique, then  and  are not uniquely determined, since
 and  clearly depend on the optimal schedule that is used. This possibility is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 3.2 Let N = f1;2g,  = (2;2),  = (3;3), p = (2;2) and  p = (1;1). Observe that
jobs 1 and 2 are completely symmetric. There are two optimal processing schedules: only crash
job 1 and keep the initial processing order, and only crash job 2 and interchange job 1 and 2.
Mathematically, (1;x1) is optimal with 1 = 12 and x1 = (1;2) and (2;x2) is optimal with
2 = 21 and x2 = (2;1). It holds that 1((1;x1)) = 1((1;x1)) = v(f1;2g) = 1 and 2((1;x1)) =
2((1;x1)) = 0. Furthermore it holds that 1((2;x2)) = 1((2;x2)) = 0 and 2((2;x2)) =
2((2;x2)) = v(f1;2g) = 1. According to Theorem 3.1 all four allocations are core elements.
In the upcoming part of this section we study marginal vectors that provide core elements. In
the next theorem we show that many marginal vectors are core elements by showing that the
corresponding orders are permutationally convex orders. In particular we show that the orders
that put the jobs in reverse order, with respect to 0, but have job 1 at an arbitrary position are
permutationally convex.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (N;v) be the corresponding game.
Let 1  j  n and let  : f1;:::;ng ! N be such that (i) = n + 1   i for all 1  i < j,
(i) = n + 2   i for all j < i  n and (j) = 1. Then it holds that  is a permutationally convex
order. In particular it holds that m(v) 2 C(v).
Since the proof is rather cumbersome, we have put it in the Appendix. The following example
illustrates Theorem 3.2.
8Example 3.3 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be as in Example 2.1 and let (N;v) be the corresponding game.
According to Theorem 3.2 the marginal vectors corresponding to the orders 4321, 4312, 4132 and
1432 are all core elements. In particular, m4321(v) = (15;2;0;0), m4312(v) = (6;11;0;0) and
m4132(v) = m1432(v) = (0;11;6;0) 2 C(v).
The orders in Theorem 3.2 are not the only permutationally convex orders of cps games. In Van
Velzen [15] it is shown that for any TU-game (N;v) it holds that if  : f1;:::;ng ! N is a
permutationally convex order, then n 1 is a permutationally convex order as well, where n 1 is
obtained by interchanging the players in the (n   1)-st and n-th position of . In the proceeding
we will show for cps games that if  : f1;:::;ng ! N is a permutationally convex order, then 1
is a permutationally convex order as well. That is, the order obtained from  by interchanging the
rst and second position is also permutationally convex. We rst need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a sequencing situation with controllable processing times
and let (N;v) be the corresponding game. Let S;T  N with jS \ Tj = 1. Then it holds that
v(S) + v(T)  v(S [ T).
The proof of this lemma is also recorded in the Appendix. Superadditivity of cps games together
with Lemma 3.3 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation with jNj = 3. Let (N;v) be the correspond-
ing game. Then (N;v) is convex.
As promised, we now show that if  : f1;:::;ng ! N is a permutationally convex order, then
the order obtained from  by interchanging the players in the rst and second position, 1, is a
permutationally convex order as well.
Theorem 3.3 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (N;v) be the corresponding game.
If  : f1;:::;ng ! N is a permutationally convex order, then 1 is a permutationally convex order
as well. In particular it holds that m1 2 C(v).
Proof: Suppose that  : f1;:::;ng ! N is a permutationally convex order. We need to show that
for all 0  i  k and all S  Nn[1(k);1] it holds that
v([1(i);1] [ S) + v([1(k);1])  v([1(k);1] [ S) + v([1(i);1]):
If i = 0, then the inequality is trivially satised because (N;v) satises superadditivity. If i  2,
then this inequality is satised since in that case [1(i);1] = [(i);], [1(k);1] = [(k);]
and our assumption that  is a permutationally convex order. So let i = 1 and k > i. Since
([1(i);1] [ S) \ [1(k);1] = f1(1)g, the inequality holds by Lemma 3.3. 2
We now illustrate the result of Van Velzen [15] about the permutational convexity of n 1 and
Theorem 3.3.
Example 3.4 Let (N;v) be as in Example 2.1. In Example 3.3 we showed that 4321, 4312, 4132
and 1432 are permutationally convex orders. From Van Velzen [15] and Theorem 3.3 it follows
that 3421, 3412, 4123 and 1423 are permutationally convex as well. Thus, m3421(v) = (15;2;0;0),
m3412(v) = (6;11;0;0) and m4123(v) = m1423(v) = (0;7;10;0) are all core elements.
The nal theorem of this section shows a way to alter a core element slightly, such that the new
allocation is still in the core.
9Theorem 3.4 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and (N;v) be the corresponding game. Let
x 2 C(v) and let j;k 2 N. Furthermore let   0 be such that   (v(fj;kg)   xk)+ and let  x be
such that  xi = xi for all i 2 Nnfj;kg,  xj = xj    and  xk = xk + . Then it holds that  x 2 C(v).
Proof: If  = 0, then it follows that  x = x, and trivially we have that  x 2 C(v). So suppose that
 > 0. It now follows by denition of  that xk +   v(fj;kg).
Showing that  x 2 C(v) boils down to showing that for each S  Nnfkg with j 2 S it holds
that  x(S)  v(S). Let S  Nnfkg such that j 2 S. Now note that
X
i2S[fkg
xi  v(S [ fkg)  v(S) + v(fj;kg); (18)






xi    =
X
i2S[fkg
xi   xk     v(S) + v(fj;kg)   xk     v(S);
where the rst inequality follows by expression (18), and the second because xk +  v(fj;kg). 2
Theorem 3.4 enables us to show a nice feature of cps games. Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation
and let (N;v) be the corresponding game. Let  : f1;:::;ng ! N be such that m(v) 2 C(v). If k
and j are the rst and second player according to , respectively, then it holds that m
k(v) = 0 and
m
j (v) = v(fj;kg). Let  = v(fj;kg). According to Theorem 3.4 it holds that  x 2 C(v), where  x is
given by  xk = m
k(v)+ = v(fj;kg),  xj = m
j (v)  = 0 and  xi = m
i (v) for all i 2 Nnfj;kg. Now
note that  x = m1(v), and thus that m1(v) 2 C(v). Therefore we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (N;v) be the corresponding game.
If  : f1;:::;ng ! N is such that m(v) 2 C(v), then m1(v) 2 C(v). In particular, the number
of marginal vectors in the core is even.
4 Convexity of cps games
In this section we investigate convexity of cps games. In particular we show for situations where all
completion time cost coecients, all crash time cost coecients and all maximum crash times are
equal, then the corresponding game is convex. Furthermore we show that relaxing this condition
might lead to nonconvex cps games.
The next theorem shows that a specic class of cps situations has corresponding convex games.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (N;v) be the corresponding game.
If i = j, i = j and pi    pi = pj    pj for all i;j 2 N, then (N;v) is convex.
Proof: Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation with i = j, i = j and pi    pi = pj    pj for all
i;j 2 N and let (N;v) be the corresponding game. For notational convenience we say that i = ,
i =  and pi    pi = q for all i 2 N, where ,  and q here denote scalars and not vectors. We
assume that q > 0. If q = 0 then no crashing is possible and the cps situation is nothing more than
a standard sequencing situation. The resulting game will be convex by Curiel et al. [4].
First we show that the optimal schedule is easy to determine in this case. Let S  N. We will
reach the optimal schedule for S by rst rearranging the jobs according to the Smith-rule and then
crashing them. Note that, since i =  and i =  for all i 2 S, it is easy to determine the position
of the jobs that are crashed in the optimal schedule. In particular, if k 2 S is the l-th job of S in
the optimal processing order, then there are jSj   l jobs of S in the queue behind k. Hence, if job
10k crashes, then this yields cost savings of ((jSj   l + 1)   )q. This term is nonnegative only if
(jSj   l + 1)    is nonnegative. Furthermore, observe that these cost savings do not depend on
k. We conclude that the cost savings due to crashing jobs will equal
PjSj
k=1((jSj   k + 1)   )+q.
These cost savings only depend on the size of S and not on the jobs of S or on the order in which
the jobs are processed.
Because the cost savings obtained from optimally crashing jobs are independent of the order
in which the jobs are processed it follows that the total cost savings are maximized if the cost
savings obtained from interchanging the jobs are maximized. In particular, the total cost savings






(jpi   ipj)+ +
jSj X
k=1
((jSj   k + 1)   )+q:




i;j2T:i<j(jpi   ipj)+ is convex (Curiel et al. [4]), it is suf-
cient for convexity of (N;v) to show that (N;w) with w(S) =
PjSj
k=1((jSj   k + 1)   )+q is
convex. So let i;j 2 N and S  Nnfi;jg. We distinguish between three cases in order to show
that w(S [ fig) + w(S [ fjg)  w(S [ fi;jg) + w(S).
Case 1: w(S [ fig) = w(S [ fjg) = 0.
Trivially it follows that w(S [ fig) + w(S [ fjg) = 0  w(S [ fi;jg) + w(S).
Case 2: w(S [ fig) = w(S [ fjg) > 0 and w(S) = 0.
Since w(S) = 0 and q > 0, it holds that jSj     0. Therefore it holds that w(S [ fig) =
w(S [ fjg) = ((jSj + 1)   )q. Hence,
w(S [ fig) + w(S [ fjg) = 2((jSj + 1)   )q
 ((jSj + 1)   )q + ((jSj + 2)   )q = w(S [ fi;jg) = w(S [ fi;jg) + w(S):
Case 3: w(S) > 0.
Because w(S) > 0, it holds that w(S [ fig) = w(S) + ((jSj + 1)   )q. Furthermore we have
that w(S [ fi;jg) = w(S [ fjg) + ((jSj + 2)   )q. Therefore,
w(S [ fig) + w(S [ fjg) = w(S) + ((jSj + 1)   )q + w(S [ fjg)
 w(S) + ((jSj + 2)   )q + w(S [ fjg) = w(S) + w(S [ fi;jg): 2
Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation with i = j, i = j and pi    pi = pj    pj for all i;j 2 N.
Let (N;v) be the corresponding game. According to the proof of Theorem 4.1 it holds that (N;v)
is the sum of a symmetric game and a classical sequencing game  a la Curiel et al. [4]. Hence, the
Shapley value of (N;v) is equal to the sum of the Shapley value of the symmetric game and the
Shapley value of the classical sequencing game. Since both can be computed easily it follows that
the Shapley value of cps games arising from these special cps situations can be computed easily.
The following examples show that by relaxing the condition of Theorem 4.1 convexity might be
lost.
Example 4.1 (i = j, i = j and  pi =  pj for all i;j 2 N) Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be given by
N = f1;2;3;4g, i = 2, i = 5 and  pi = 2 for all i 2 N. Furthermore, let p = (7;3;3;7). Let
(N;v) be the corresponding game. Since 2 < , it follows for coalition f1;3g no cost savings
can be obtained by crashing job 1. Since also no cost savings can be obtained by rearranging
the jobs, it follows that v(f1;3g) = 0. Because 2 <  and 3 >  it follows that for the
grand coalition it is optimal to crash exactly two jobs, namely the jobs that are in the rst and
11second position of the optimal processing order. By considering all possibilities of crashing two
of the four jobs, it is straightforward to see that the schedule (2314;(7;2;2;7)) 2 AN is optimal.
As a result we have that v(N) = 20. Now observe that (2314;(7;2;3;7)) 2 Af1;2;3g and that
(1234;(2;3;3;7)) 2 Af1;3;4g. These schedules yield cost savings of 17 and 5 for coalitions f1;2;3g
and f1;3;4g respectively. Therefore v(f1;2;3g)  17 and v(f1;3;4g)  5. We conclude that
v(f1;2;3g) + v(f1;3;4g)  22 > 20 = v(N) + v(f1;3g), and thus that (N;v) is not convex.
Example 4.2 (i = j, pi = pj and  pi =  pj for all i;j 2 N) Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be given by
N = f1;2;3;4;5g, i = 2, pi = 2 and  pi = 1 for all i 2 N. Furthermore, let  = (6;6;3;3;6).
Let (N;v) be the corresponding game. For each coalition, the optimal order can be reached by
rst interchanging jobs, and then crashing them. Since i = 2 and pi = 2 for all i 2 N it follows
that (ipj   jpi) = 0 for all i;j 2 N. That is, rst rearranging jobs yields no cost savings and
no extra costs. Hence, the cost savings for each coalition consist of cost savings due to crashing
only. Because i = 2 and pi    pi = 1 for all i 2 N, it is optimal for each coalition to put the jobs
with lowest i to the front as much as possible. In particular, for coalitions f1;3;4g and N the
optimal schedules are (12345;(2;2;1;2;2)) 2 Af1;3;4g and (34125;(2;2;1;1;2)) 2 AN respectively.
This yields cost savings of v(f1;3;4g) = 1 and v(N) = 12. For coalitions f1;2;3;4g and f1;3;4;5g
the optimal schedules are given by (34125;(2;2;1;1;2)) 2 Af1;2;3;4g and (12345;(1;2;1;1;2)) 2
Af1;3;4;5g, respectively, with cost savings v(f1;2;3;4g) = 8 and v(f1;3;4;5g) = 6. We conclude
that v(f1;2;3;4g) + v(f1;3;4;5g) = 14 > 13 = v(N) + v(f1;3;4g), and thus that (N;v) is not
convex.
Example 4.3 (i = j, pi = pj and  pi =  pj for all i;j 2 N) Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be given by N =
f1;2;3;4g, i = 5, pi = 2 and  pi = 1 for all i 2 N. Furthermore, let  = (1;1;5;1). Let
(N;v) be the corresponding game. Since coalition f1;3g is a disconnected coalition, the only
cost savings it can obtain is by crashing job 1. Hence, v(f1;3g) = 1. For the grand coalition
the schedule (3124;(2;2;1;2)) 2 AN is optimal, with cost savings v(N) = 19. Furthermore it
holds that (3124;(2;2;1;2)) 2 Af1;2;3g and that (1234;(1;2;1;2)) 2 Af1;3;4g. These schedule lead
to cost savings of 18 and 3 for coalitions f1;2;3g and f1;3;4g respectively. We conclude that
v(f1;2;3g) + v(f1;3;4g)  21 > 20 = v(N) + v(f1;3g), and thus that (N;v) is not convex.
As a nal remark to this paper we conjecture that for a cps situation (N;0;;;p;  p) the corre-
sponding game is convex if it holds that i = j, i = j and pi = pj for all i;j 2 N.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation. Let (;x) 2 AN be an optimal









k)   i)(pi   xi) (20)
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j(pi   xi): (25)











(ixj   jxi): (26)
Observe that the sum of expressions (23) and (26) coincides with i, since in (26) we sum over all
neighbourswitches in which player i is involved as the back player that give rise to positive cost








The following lemma states that if a coalition S  N consists of several components, then the
optimal schedule of S is also optimal for the last component. This result is logical since the jobs
from other components do not benet from the crashing of a job of the last component.
Lemma A.1 Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a sequencing situation with controllable processing times.
Let S  N consist of t  2 components. Let St be the last component. Then every optimal
schedule for S restricted to St is optimal for St.
The proof is omitted since it is trivial.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Let (N;0;;;p;  p) be a cps situation and let (N;v) be the corre-
sponding game. Let 1  j  n and let  : f1;:::;ng ! N be such that (i) = n + 1   i for all
1  i < j, (i) = n + 2   i for all j < i  n and (j) = 1. We need to show that for all 0  i  k
and all S  Nn[(k);] expression (2) holds.
So let 0  i  k and let S  Nn[(k);]. We assume that 1  i < k and that S 6= ;, since for
i = 0 expression (2) trivially holds because of superadditivity. Note that since S 6= ;, it holds that
k 6= n.
Because of the structure of , it holds that [(k);] and [(i);] both consist of at most two
connected components. In particular, they consist of possibly job 1 and a tail of 0. If 1 2 [(k);],
then we will denote the rst component by K1 = f1g and the second by K2 = [(k);]nf1g. If
1 62 [(k);], then there is one component which we will denote by K2 and we dene K1 = ;.
Similarly, if 1 2 [(i);], then I1 = f1g and I2 = [(i);]nf1g. If 1 62 [(i);], then there is one
component which we will denote by I2 and we dene I1 = ;.
14Denote the optimal processing schedule of [(k);] by ([(k);];p[(k);]), and the optimal pro-
cessing schedule of [(i);] [ S by ([(i);][S;p[(i);][S). We will create suboptimal schedules for
coalitions [(k);] [ S and [(i);], depending on the optimal schedules of coalitions [(i);] [ S
and [(k);]. In particular we "allocate" the processing times of coalitions [(i);][S and [(k);]
to coalitions [(i);] and [(k);][S. In this way we obtain suboptimal processing schedules. The
prot obtained at these suboptimal processing schedules give lowerbounds for v([(k);] [ S) and
v([(i);]). We will show that the sum of these lowerbounds exceeds the sum of v([(i);] [ S)
and v([(k);]). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: I2 ( K2.
Before we will obtain our suboptimal schedules, we rst derive expressions for v([(k);]) and












The cost savings of [(k);] can be divided into two parts. The cost savings obtained by a possible
crash of job 1 equal (27). Note that if 1 62 [(k);], then K1 = ; and expression (27) is zero by
denition. The other cost savings that can be obtained by interchanging and crashing jobs of K2
equal (28) according to Lemma A.1.
Since I2 and K2 are both tails of 0, I2 ( K2 and S \ K2 = ;, we conclude that S is not
connected to I2. Denote the components of [(i);] [ S by S1;:::;St+1, for t  1. So St+1 = I2






































Expression (29) denotes the cost savings obtained by a possible crash of job 1, if 1 2 [(i);]. The
cost savings obtained by crashing the jobs in S equal (30). Expressions (31) and (32) are the cost
savings obtained by switching the jobs in S [I1. Because of Lemma A.1 the cost savings obtained
by crashing and rearranging jobs in I2 can be expressed as (33).
Now we will create suboptimal schedules ([(i);];p[(i);]) and ([(k);][S;p[(k);][S) for coali-














l g; if l = 1;
pl; if l 2 Nn[(i);], l 6= 1.
Note that if 1 62 [(i);], then it necessarily holds that 1 62 [(k);] or that 1 62 [(i);][S, because
[(k);] \ S = ;. This implies that if 1 62 [(i);], then p
[(k);]
1 = p1 or that p
[(i);][S
1 = p1, and
15therefore that p
[(i);]
1 = p1. We conclude that the processing times p[(i);] satisfy the admissibility
constraints (A1) and (A2).
Furthermore let [(i);] be obtained from 0 by rearranging the jobs of [(i);] according to the
Smith-rule using processing times p[(i);], taking of course into account the admissibility constraint
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l ; if l 2 K2;
p
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l g; if l = 1;
pl; if l 2 Nn([(k);] [ S), l 6= 1.
Observe that if 1 62 [(k);][S, then 1 62 [(i);][S and 1 62 [(k);]. Hence, if 1 62 [(k);][S,
then it holds that p
[(k);]
1 = p1 and p
[(i);][S
1 = p1, and therefore that p
[(k);][S
1 = p1. We conclude
that the processing times p[(k);][S satisfy the admissibility constraints (A1) and (A2).
Now using these processing times, let [(k);][S be the order obtained from 0 by interchanging
the jobs according to the Smith-rule, while of course taking into account the admissibility constraint
(A3). However, only interchange two jobs if both jobs are in K2, or both jobs are in S[I1. This last
condition is a technical detail in order to keep the number of terms of our lowerbound for the cost
savings of coalition [(k);] [ S more manageable. Observe that this restriction only lowers our
lowerbound of v([(k);][S). Again note, by Lemma A.1, that this processing schedule restricted






































Now rst observe that expressions (35) and (33) coincide, as well as expressions (40) and (28).










l for all l 2 S. We conclude that showing (2) boils down to showing that the sum of expres-
sions (34), (36) and (38) exceeds the sum of expressions (27), (29) and (31). We now distinguish
between three subcases.
Subcase 1a: 1 62 [(k);].
16This implies that K1 = ;, and thus that I1 = ;. Therefore it holds that expressions (27),
(29), (34) and (36) all are equal to zero. Hence, it is sucient to show that (38) exceeds (31)





j for all j 2 S1. We conclude that (38) and (31) coincide.




















1 . Note that it now holds that (38)




j for all j 2 S1. So showing that (2) is satised, boils
down to showing that the sum of expressions (34) and (36) exceeds the sum of expressions (27)
and (29).
Now rst suppose that p
[(k);]





1 it follows that expression (34) is equal to zero as well. Also we have that




1 and [(i);]  [(k);]. So
expression (2) is satised in this case.
Secondly, suppose that p
[(k);]
1 < p1. Since optimal processing times can only take two val-
ues it holds that p
[(k);]







1 g = p
[(i);][S
1 it follows that p
[(i);][S







1 g = maxf p1;  p1g =  p1.
Observe that because 1 2 [(k);], that 1 62 S. Since p
[(i);][S
1 < p1, this implies that
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1 =  p1. Note that




1 =  p1
and K1 = I1 = f1g. We conclude that (2) is satised.













1 . Since optimal









1 = p1. Therefore expressions (29) and (34) both are equal to zero. So showing
that (2) holds boils down to showing that the sum of expressions (36) and (38) exceeds the sum of




















m)(p1    p1); (42)
where the equality holds because K1 = f1g and because p
[(k);][S
1 =  p1. The inequality holds since

















(m p1   1p[(k);][S
m )+: (44)
For the equality we have used that p
[(k);][S
1 =  p1. Since K1 = f1g and p
[(k);]
1 =  p1, it follows
that expression (41) coincides with expression (27). Therefore it is now sucient to show that the
sum of expressions (42), (43) and (44) exceeds expression (31). If it holds that 1 62 S1, then it holds
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The inequality holds because of Lemma 3.2 by taking a1 = 1, a2 = m, q1 = p1,  q1 =  p1 and
q2 = p
[(k);][S
m . The equality is satised because p
[(i);][S










m for all m 2 S1nf1g and our assumption that 1 2 S1. We conclude that
(2) is satised.
Case 2: I2 = K2.
Since we have assumed that i < k and hence that [(i);] 6= [(k);] we conclude, using the
structure of , that I1 = ; and K1 = f1g. Denote the components of [(i);] [ S by S1;:::;St,






























18First we note, because I1 = ;, that v([(i);]) = v(I2) = v(K2). So showing that (2) is satised
boils down to showing that the sum of expressions (46), (48) and (49) is exceeded by v([(k);][S).
We will obtain a lowerbound of v([(k);] [ S) by creating a suboptimal schedule for coalition









l ; if l 2 [(i);] [ S;
p
[(k);]
l ; if l = 1;
pl; if l 2 Nn([(k);] [ S).
Let [(k);][S be constructed by rearranging the jobs of coalition [(k);][S using the Smith-rule
and our suboptimal processing times. However, only switch jobs if both are in [(i);] [ S. We































1 . Note that expres-





l for all l 2 [(i);] [ S. Furthermore we have that expressions (49) and




l for all l 2 [(i);] [ S. We conclude that the sum of
v([(k);] [ S) and v([(i);]) exceeds the sum of v([(i);] [ S) and v([(k);]). This ends the
proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Let S;T  N with S \ T = fig for some i 2 N. We rst introduce
some notation. Denote the connected components of S by Sk, k = 1;:::;a and those of T by
Tl, l = 1;:::;b. Let Sc, 1  c  a be such that i 2 Sc, and let Td, 1  d  b be such that
i 2 Td. Finally let S1
c = fm 2 Sc : m < ig, S2
c = fm 2 Sc : m > ig, T1
d = fm 2 Td : m < ig
and T2
d = fm 2 Td : m > ig. Note that since S \ T = fig it holds that S1
c \ T1
d = ; and that
S2
c \ T2
d = ;. Let the connected components of S [ T be denoted by Bk, k = 1;:::;e. Now let
(S;pS) 2 AS be an optimal processing schedule for coalition S and (T;pT) 2 AT be an optimal


















The cost savings for coalition S can be split into two components. The rst component, (53), are
the (possibly negative) cost savings that are obtained by crashing some of the jobs. Expression


















We will now construct a suboptimal schedule for coalition S[T. We will show that the cost savings
obtained at this suboptimal schedule exceed the sum of v(S) and v(T).







j ; if j 2 Snfig;
pT
j ; if j 2 Tnfig;
minfpS
j ;pT
j g; if j = i;
pj; if j 2 Nn(S [ T).
Furthermore, S[T is the order obtained by rearranging the jobs of S [ T according to the Smith-
rule using as processing times pS[T and taking into account the admissibility constraint (A3). This
yields



















































First note that it holds that pS[T
j = pS
j for all j 2 S and that pS[T
j = pT
j for all j 2 T. It
holds that expression (59) is equal to zero because pS[T
i = pi. Furthermore, expression (57) ex-
ceeds expression (53), as well as expression (58) exceeds expression (55), since pS
i = pT
i = pi. So
showing that v(S) + v(T)  v(S [ T) boils down to showing that expression (60) exceeds the sum
of expressions (54) and (56). Let j;h 2 Sk for some 1  k  a, i.e. let j;h appear in a connected
component of S. It follows that they also appear in a connected component of S [T, i.e. there is a
1  g  e with j;h 2 Bg. We conclude that the term in (54) dealing with j and h also appears in
(60). Similarly, each pair j;h 2 Tl, for some 1  l  b, appears in a connected component of S [T.
Therefore we also have that the term in (56) dealing with j;h also appears in (60). Observe that
each pair in S is not in T, and that each pair in T is not in S, because jS \ Tj = 1. Thus it holds,
since pS[T
j = pS
j for all j 2 S, pS[T
j = pT
j for all j 2 T and the nonnegativity of every term in (60),
20that (60) exceeds the sum of (54) and (56).
Case 2: pS
i = pT
i =  pi.




i . Observe that this implies that
pS[T
j = pS
j for all j 2 S and pS[T
j = pT














k)   i)(pi   pS[T
i )










k)   i)(pi   pT
i ) (62)
where the inequality is satised since i  i, and by assumption pS[T
i = pS
i = pT
i . Observe that
the sum of expressions (57) and (61) exceeds expression (53) and that the sum of expressions (58)
and (62) exceeds expression (55). Hence, showing that v(S) + v(T)  v(S [ T) boils down to
showing that expression (60) exceeds the sum of expressions (54) and (56). For this last statement
we refer to Case 1, where we already showed this inequality. Note that we can refer to Case 1,
since in both cases we have that pS[T
j = pS
j for all j 2 S and pS[T
j = pT




Without loss of generality assume that pS
i < pT
i , or equivalently that pS
i =  pi and pT
i = pi.
Hence we have, by denition of pS[T
i , that pS[T
i = pS
i =  pi. Observe that we can obtain the



























where the equality holds because pS[T
i = pS
i and the inequality since T 2
d  T. Observe that it holds
that expression (58) exceeds expression (55), since pT
i = pi. Furthermore we have that the sum of
expressions (57) and (63) exceeds expression (53). Therefore, showing that v(S)+v(T)  v(S [T)
21boils down to showing that the sum of expressions (60) and (64) exceeds the sum of expressions



























Now it holds that (65) coincides with (54), since pS[T
l = pS
l for all l 2 S. So we only need to show






















































where the inequality holds since pS[T
j = pT































where the inequality holds because of Lemma 3.2 by taking a1 = i, a2 = m, q1 = pi,  q1 = pS
i
and q2 = pT
m. The equality is satised because pT
i = pi. Since the sum of expressions (67) and (69)
coincides with expression (56) we conclude that v(S) + v(T)  v(S [ T). 2
22